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Abstract
A core question in the contemporary debate on distributive justice
is how the fair distribution of income is affected by differences in tal-
ent and effort. Important theories of distributive justice, such as strict
egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism and libertarianism, all give dif-
ferent answers to this question. This paper presents the results from a
version of the dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded
by a production phase. Each player’s contribution is a result of an
exogenously given talent and a chosen effort. We estimate simultan-
eously the prevalence of three main principles of distributive justice
among the players as well as the distribution of weights they attach
to fairness considerations.
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1 Introduction
People are motivated by fairness considerations and are willing to sacrifice
pecuniary gains in order to avoid large deviations from what they consider
a fair solution. This type of behaviour has been extensively documented
in laboratory experiments with games such as the ultimatum game and the
dictator game (Camerer, 2003). However, while these games show us that a
substantial fraction of the players are motivated by fairness considerations,
they do not provide much information on the pluralism of fairness ideals
present in society. In the standard versions of the ultimatum game and
the dictator game, the money to be distributed by the players is essentially
“manna from heaven”, and it seems rather uncontroversial to assume that
people in general view the fair solution to be to distribute money equally in
these cases.
The core question in both the modern political debate on distributive
justice and in normative theoretical reasoning, however, is how to understand
fairness in more complex situations involving production. In particular, there
is substantial disagreement about the extent to which people should be held
responsible for various factors affecting their pre-tax income. The controversy
between the left wing and the right wing of the political spectrum can be
interpreted to a large extent as a disagreement about how differences in
effort and talent should be allowed to affect the income distribution. The
prevalence of the view that luck determines income in a society seems to
play an important role in explaining cross-country variation in choices of
re-distributive policies (Alesina and Angeletos, 2004).
Three fairness ideals are prominent in this debate. Proponents of the
strict egalitarian doctrine argue that people should not at all be held re-
sponsible for their effort and talent, thus considering equal sharing as the
fair solution even in cases involving production. Libertarians, on the other
hand, claim that people should be held responsible for both their talent and
their effort, which implies that the fair solution is to give each person what
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she produces. As an intermediate position, liberal egalitarians view effort
as within and talent beyond individual control, and thus believe that re-
distributive policies should aim at equalising differences due to differences in
talent but should allow for inequalities due to differences in effort.
Which of these fairness ideals is more prevalent in society? This question
is not easily answered, because in actual behaviour, fairness considerations
are usually balanced against self-interest considerations. Differences in ob-
served behaviour therefore may be due to two different sources. People may
differ both in the importance they assign to fairness considerations and with
respect to what they consider to be a fair distribution. As a result, the most
common ways to elicit data on the prevalence of different fairness ideals have
been to use surveys or experiments where the proposer is not a stake-holder,
thereby avoiding any self-serving bias (see Konow (2003) for an overview of
this literature). However, these approaches have the weakness that the par-
ticipants do not have to demonstrate any willingness to act on the endorsed
fairness ideals, and consequently they can be very sensitive to framing effects.
The aim of this paper is to show how one may estimate simultaneously
the prevalence of different fairness ideals and the degree of importance people
attach to fairness considerations in an experiment where participants have a
stake in the outcome. We study a dictator game in which the distribution
phase is preceded by a production phase. The players differ with respect
to both effort and talent, and thus different fairness ideals provide different
answers to the question of what is a fair distribution of the total production.
Given a simple random utility model where people make a trade-off between
pecuniary gains and fairness considerations when proposing a distribution of
the production, we estimate the share of the population motivated by each
of the three fairness ideals (strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism and
libertarianism) and the mean value and variance in the parameter measuring
the importance people attach to fairness considerations. We also provide a
simple test of whether there is “moral wriggling” among the participants,
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that is, whether they decide opportunistically on a fairness ideal after the
distributional situation is known (Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2004).
Section 2 describes the basic model in more detail, including the fairness
ideals. Section 3 provides a discussion of the experimental design, and the
results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 contains a discussion of related
literature and some concluding comments.
2 The model
We study a situation in which individuals differ in both effort and talent, and
in which effort is clearly within individual control, whereas talent is clearly
beyond individual control. Effort, qi, is the amount of money an individual
i chooses to invest in the production phase. Talent, ai, is the rate of return
on the investment. The income generated by individual i in the production
phase is then xi = aiqi. The experiment is designed such that there is no
need to model the choice of effort in the production phase.
The distribution phase will always be in a two-person setting, where we
refer to the individuals as person 1 and person 2. The total income to be
distributed is given by X(a,q) = x1(a1, q1) + x2(a2, q2), where a = (a1, a2)
and q = (q1, q2). Each individual is to propose an amount of income y for
herself and X − y for her opponent.
2.1 Individual motivation: income and fairness
We assume that the individuals are motivated by both a desire for income
and a fairness ideal, where individual i’s fairness ideal is denoted mk(i) and
specifies a unique distribution in any given situation. We also assume that
the marginal disutility of deviating from the fairness ideal is increasing in the
size of the deviation from the fair distribution. More formally, we assume
that person i is maximising the following utility function when proposing a
distribution (this is a generalisation of the utility function studied by Bolton
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and Ockenfels (2000)),
Vi(y; a,q) = γy − βi
2
(
(y −mk(i)(a,q))2 , (1)
where the parameters γ > 0 and βi ≥ 0 determine the weight individual i
gives to income and to fairness considerations. The optimal proposal, y∗, is
(given an interior solution)
y∗ = mk(i)(a,q) + γ/βi. (2)
It follows immediately that the optimal proposal depends on both the
fairness ideal endorsed by the individual and the importance assigned to
fairness considerations.
A player with βi = 0 would always keep all the money for herself.
2.2 The fairness ideals
We assume that an individual endorses some version of strict egalitarianism,
libertarianism or liberal egalitarianism. Each of the fairness ideals satisfies
the no-waste condition, and thus we can index the fair distribution such that
mk and X − mk is what fairness ideal k assigns to person 1 and person 2
respectively.
Strict egalitarians do not hold people responsible for their effort and tal-
ent, and therefore they view equal sharing as the fair distribution. This
fairness ideal may be interpreted in two different ways in the present con-
text. First, one may defend the simplest and strongest notion of equality
(see, for example, Nielsen (1985)), where fairness is to distribute gross total
income equally. We call this the strong version of strict egalitarianism (SES).
mSES(a,q) = X(a,q)/2. (3)
Alternatively, one may interpret strict egalitarianism as equally distributing
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the net total income, which implies that the two persons receive the same
overall income from the game (see also Iversen, Jackson, Kebede, Munro
and Verschoor (2005)). We call this the weak version of strict egalitarianism
(SEW).
mSEW (a,q) = q1 + (X(a,q)− q1 − q2)/2. (4)
The strict egalitarian view is closely related to the inequality-aversion
models in the experimental literature, which assume that people dislike in-
equitable outcomes (see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer
and Kurki (2004). The weaker version may also be given a welfarist inter-
pretation. If we assume that the fair distribution is what maximises a quasi-
concave social welfare function, that individuals derive the same welfare from
income and that marginal welfare decreases with income, then it follows that
the fair solution is to distribute the net total income equally.
The libertarian fairness ideal is at the opposite extreme of strict egalit-
arianism. The fair distribution is simply to give each person exactly what
she produces,
mL(a,q) = a1q1. (5)
This view may be defended by arguing that people should be held responsible
for both their effort and their talent, and hence that a low talent does not
justify any redistribution among individuals (Nozick, 1974). The fair solution
may thus involve an unequal distribution of income due to differences in both
effort and talent.
Liberal egalitarianism, on the other hand, defends the view that people
should only be held responsible for their choices (Roemer, 1998). A reason-
able interpretation of this fairness ideal in the present context is to view the
fair distribution as giving each person a share of the total income equal to
her share of the total effort.
mLE(a,q) =
q1
q1 + q2
X(a,q). (6)
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This principle is equivalent to what has been described as the accountability
principle (Konow, 1996, 2000). It implies that if two persons make the same
choice, then the fair solution is to give them the same income. If they make
different choices, the liberal egalitarian fairness ideal justifies an unequal
distribution of income between them.
Even though these fairness ideals provide different solutions to the dis-
tributional problem, it is important to note that on average they instruct
individuals to offer the same amount to the other person. In any particular
game and for any fairness ideal k, the fair solution would be for person 1 to
offer X −mk to person 2 and for person 2 to offer mk to person 1, which im-
plies that the average fair offer in the game is X/2. Hence, it is not possible
to extract any information about the prevalence of the various fairness ideals
from the size of the average offer. In order to establish such information,
we need to study how each individual’s offer depends on the distribution of
effort and talent in the situation.
3 Experimental design
Our experiment is a version of the dictator game with production, where
production is dependent on both factors within and factors beyond indi-
vidual control. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant was
given money credits equal to 300 Norwegian Krone (NOK), approximately
50 USD, and informed about the rules of the game.1 Each participant was
then randomly assigned a low or a high rate of return. Participants with
a low rate of return would double the value of any investment they made,
while those who were assigned a high rate of return would quadruple their
investment.
In the production phase the participants were asked to determine how
much they wanted to invest in two different games. Their choice alternatives
1The complete instructions are available on request from the authors.
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were limited to 0, 100 and 200 NOK, and the total amount invested in the
two games could not exceed the initial money credit they received. Any
money they chose not to invest they could keep after the experiment ended,
and thus they faced a genuine choice of investment.
In the distribution phase, the participants were paired with a player who
had the same rate of return in one game and with a player who had a different
rate of return in another game. In each game, they were given information
about the other participant’s rate of return, investment level and total con-
tribution and were then asked to propose a distribution of the total income.
The participants were not informed about the outcome of the first game be-
fore the second game was completed. For each participant, one of the two
games and one of the two proposals in that game (the participant’s own that
of the opponent) were randomly selected to determine the final outcome.
The total earnings from the experiment for a participant were then the sum
of the final outcome and the amount of money not invested.
At the end of the experiment, the participants were assigned a code and
instructed to mail the code and the bank account numbers to the accounting
division of the Institute for Research in Economics and Business Adminis-
tration (SNF). Independently, the research team mailed a list with the codes
and total payment to the accounting division, who then disbursed the earn-
ings directly to the participants’ bank accounts. This procedure ensured that
neither the participants nor the research team was in a position to identify
how much each participant earned in the experiment.
The participants in the experiment were all recruited among the first-year
students at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
They were not informed about the purpose of the experiment but were only
invited to take part in a research project. In the invitation, they were told
that they would initially receive 300 NOK for use in an experiment that would
last for about 40 minutes and that their total earnings from the experiment
would depend on their choices. The hourly opportunity cost for most of
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these students would be about 100 NOK, while the average payout was 447
NOK. Each student was only permitted to participate once. We had one
session with 20 participants, one session with 12, and four sessions with 16,
comprising a to total of 96 participants. The participants were in the same
computer lab during a session, but all communication was anonymous and
was conducted through a web-based interface.
In Table 1, we see the distribution of investments in the first and the
second game. No one kept the full endowment, one participant (with a low
rate of return) invested only 100 NOK and 10 participants (four with a high
rate of return and six with a low rate of return) invested 200 NOK. The
remaining 85 participants invested the full endowment of 300 NOK, evenly
distributed between investing (200, 100) and (100, 200). The fact that some
participants did not invest the full endowment indicates that they perceived
the choice of investment as a genuine choice. However, since most did invest
the full amount, we doubt that the variation in choices in the production
phase introduces any important bias in our analysis of the distribution phase.
[Table 1 about here.]
In the distribution phase, the paired players could differ with respect both
to their rate of return and their investment, which implies that there were
four different classes of distributional situations in the experiment. First,
there were situations where the players were identical with respect to both
their rate of return and their investment. All the four fairness ideals imply
the same fair distribution in this case, namely that both players get an equal
share of the total income. Second, there were situations where the players
had the same rate of return but differed in their investment level. This
would make the liberal egalitarian and the libertarian fairness ideal coincide,
whereas the two versions of strict egalitarianism would imply different views
of the fair distribution. Third, there were situations where the players had
made the same investment but differed in their rate of return. All the fairness
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ideals except for libertarianism consider an equal distribution fair in such a
case. Finally, there were situations where the players differed along both
dimensions. In these situations, the strong version of strict egalitarianism
and libertarianism imply the same fair offer if the player with the high talent
is the player with the low effort. Otherwise, all the fairness ideals differ in
this case. Table 2 reports the empirical distribution of the four classes of
distributional situations in the experiment.
[Table 2 about here.]
As we can see from Table 2, there was almost a balanced design with
respect to the four distributional situations.2 We have 44 situations where
the prevalence of different fairness ideals cannot influence the distribution of
offers made. In the remaining observations, the differences in observed beha-
viour may be due to the fact that people endorse different fairness ideals. In
order to get a clearer view of the potential variation caused by the prevalence
of different fairness ideals, we present in Figure 1 pair-wise scatter plots of
how the various fairness ideals correlate to each other in all the distributional
situations in the experiment. If two fairness ideals coincide for all the dis-
tributional situations, then all the points should be at the diagonal in the
respective comparison. Figure 2 shows that the fairness ideals imply consid-
erable variation for the distributional situations in the experiment, possibly
with the exception of the two versions of strict egalitarianism. These overlap
to a great extent, and thus we should not expect to gain much by including
both in the empirical analysis of this experiment.
[Figure 1 about here.]
2There are 190, not 192, distributional situations in total, since a single incidence of a
software problem caused a pair of participants to enter invalid data in one distributional
situation. This pair was dropped from all further analysis.
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4 Results
We begin by presenting some descriptive statistics before we formulating
and estimating a random utility model. Finally, we consider the possibility
of “moral wriggling” by the participants.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 summarises some main features of the offers made. The average
offer to the opponent is 27.1% (which amounts to 229 NOK), while the me-
dian is 29.2%. This is slightly higher than what is commonly observed in
the standard dictator games without production (Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Camerer, 2003), and may indicate that the presence of a production phase
causes people to care more about fairness considerations. The maximum
offer is of 75% of the total income.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 contains the full distribution of offers made. We see that there are
marked steps in the distribution. In fact, out of 190 proposed distributions,
184 are of even 100 NOK amounts. The remaining six proposals are of even
50 NOK amounts. While 31% of the offers leave the opponent with nothing,
some offer substantial amounts; 20 out of 190 offers are NOK 600 (about
USD 100) or above. 27% of the offers are exactly fifty-fifty (not reported in
table).
[Table 5 about here.]
In Table 5 we present some descriptive regressions. We see from the first
regression that the participants demand almost all of their own production
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(a1q1) but only two-thirds of the opponent’s production (a2q2). This differ-
ence is statistically significant. Hence, in the distribution phase, it seems to
matter who contributes to the production of the total income. The second
and third regressions show that it also matters how the contribution came
about. The participants seem to take more of the opponent’s production if
this is due to a high rate of return than if it is due to a high investment. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that there are individuals who care about
the distinction between effort and talent, but in itself these regressions are
not very informative about individual preferences.
The model outlined in Section 2 implies that there might be identification
from the fact that no one should ever offer more than what is implied by
their fairness ideal. If one observes an offer of more than what is implied
by a fairness ideal, then the model rules out the possibility that this person
is motivated by this particular fairness ideal. 75 out of the 96 participants,
however, demand more than what is implied by all the fairness ideals, and
hence our experimental data are not well suited to a revealed-preference
approach to the identification of the prevalence of different fairness ideals.
Moreover, it turns out that two out of the 96 participants demand less than
what is implied by all the fairness ideals. Estimation of any model that does
not allow for some smoothing of choices will therefore fail.
4.2 Empirical model
We adapt the model to bring it into line with two features in the experi-
mental data. First, given that the participants have a very strong tendency
to choose round numbers, we restrict the choice of y to the set Y(a,q) =
{0, 50, 100, . . . , X(a,q)}. Second, we introduce random variation that is idio-
syncratic to each choice. Given the utility function V defined in (1), we
introduce the random utility model
Ui(y; ·) = Vi(y; ·) + εy. (7)
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We assume that the εy’s are i.i.d. extreme value distributed, and that in-
dividuals choose a y, call it y∗, such that Ui(y∗; ·) ≥ Ui(y; ·) for all y in
Y.3
The model we propose has a mixed logit structure where each person is
characterised by their fairness ideal, k(i), as well as the parameter βi de-
termining the importance a person assigns to fairness considerations. We
cannot classify individuals by (k(i), βi), but we estimate the distribution of
these characteristics. The distribution of moral types is discrete in nature,
and we approximate the distribution of β by a log-normal distribution, such
that log β ∼ N(ζ, σ2). Since the fairness ideal and the importance a per-
son assigns to fairness considerations are unobserved by us, these must be
integrated out for the unconditional choice probabilities as functions of the
observed variables. We provide the likelihood function in an appendix.
Formal proofs of identification are difficult to provide in this situation
where there is a large (but discrete) set of outcomes. However, consider
what can be learned from the situations where a1 = a2 and q1 = q2. In these
situations all fairness ideals coincide at X/2. The mean offer in these situ-
ations reflect the mean weight given to fairness considerations. The variance
of offers in these situations reflect both the distribution of β and the smooth-
ing introduced by the extreme value distributed ε’s. There is, however, also
a discontinuity in the design, in that all offers above X/2 must result from
the smoothing alone. With the parametric assumption of log-normality of
f(β), these situations provide information about (γ, ζ, σ). Repeated observa-
tions, and the fact that we expose individuals to very different distributional
situations, provide information about the distribution of moral ideals and
further precision about the distribution of β.
3The random utility structure of discrete offers made in our empirical model is similar
to that of Andreoni, Castillo and Petrie (2004), but our model is estimated on the full
population, and we do not estimate individual-specific utility functions.
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4.3 Structural estimates
In Table 6, we present the estimates of the structural model. Column 1
presents the structural estimates with all the fairness ideals, including both
the weak and the strong version of strict egalitarianism. Columns 2–5 drop
one of the fairness ideals in turn. In all columns, the estimate for each of
the fairness ideals is the share of the participants who are motivated by this
particular fairness ideal.
[Table 6 about here.]
From the different specifications 1–5, and as we could expect from Fig-
ure 1, we see that the strong and the weak version of strict egalitarianism are
not well separated in our data. Neither the log-likelihood nor the other para-
meters are much affected in specification 3 where the weak version of strict
egalitarianism is excluded. There are, however, large effects of dropping any
of the other fairness ideals. Specification 3, in which we have 39.7% strict
egalitarians, 43.4% liberal egalitarians and 16.8% libertarians, is therefore
our preferred specification.
Based on these estimates, we make three observations. First, there is con-
siderable pluralism in the fairness ideals that motivate people, even in rather
simple distributional situations involving a homogeneous group of students.
Second, the majority of the participants (the liberal egalitarians and the
libertarians) care about the investments made by the opponent when they
decide how much to offer. This implies that fairness considerations cannot
be reduced to income inequality aversion in these distributional situations.
Third, the estimated share of strict egalitarians is larger than the share of of-
fers that are fifty-fifty. This is due to the fact that the fairness ideals overlap
in some distributional situations and that people make active trade-offs.
The distribution of the parameter β, which determines the importance
that people attach to fairness considerations, is assumed to be log-normal
and characterised by parameters (ζ, σ), while the parameter γ determines
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the weight given to deterministic utility relative to the smoothing implied
from the extreme value distributed ε’s.4 To get a handle on the effect of our
estimated parameters, we provide Figure 2. This figure takes as the point
of departure a situation where the total production is 1000 and the fairness
ideal endorsed by a hypothetical individual specifies an equal split. We then
provide, for every inner decile of the distribution of β, the deterministic
utility and, plotted as solid bars, the implied choice probabilities for all even
50 NOK amounts for this hypothetical individual. By way of illustration,
consider the case where CDF (β) = 0.5. The deterministic part of the utility
function reaches its maximum when the individual offers 350 NOK, and thus
the individual makes an active trade-off between fairness and self-interest
considerations. The smoothing, however, implies that there is a positive
but small probability of observing such a person offering more than what is
considered just by the fairness ideal she endorses (as seen by the small mass
to the left of the fairness ideal).
[Figure 2 about here.]
Our general impression from Figure 2 is that the population can be di-
vided into three main groups. About 30% of the participants assign so little
importance to fairness considerations that they have no inner maximum in
their choice problem. Thus the most common choice among them is to offer
the opponent nothing. 40% of the participants make active trade-offs between
fairness and self-interest considerations, whereas 30% of the participants care
mainly about fairness considerations.
To see how well our estimates predict the actual distribution of offers,
we simulate a distribution of offers for the distributional situations in the
experiment. As we can see from Figure 3, there is a close fit. In particular,
we note that we fit the large mass at the two most distinct points in the
distribution (offers of 0% and of 50%). At the ends of the support, the
4The model is normalised by the constant variance of εi, which is pi2/6.
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smoothing can only operate one way, and hence we slightly underpredict
the number of proposals that offer nothing, and we slightly overpredict the
number of very high offers. This is to be expected given the random utility
structure of the model.
[Figure 3 about here.]
4.4 True pluralism or moral wriggling?
We have assumed that individuals have a fairness ideal that is independ-
ent of the distributional situation in which they find themselves. Alternat-
ive approaches emphasise self-deception (Konow, 2000) or “moral wriggling”
(Dana et al., 2004), where the idea is that individuals may use ambiguity
in the distributional situation to further their own pecuniary self-interest at
the expense of fairness. In a setting such as the one we are examining in
this paper, a natural application of this train of thought is to allow for the
possibility that people have no firm view about the fairness ideal to which
they should adhere, and that they choose opportunistically the fairness ideal
that benefits them most in any particular distributional situation.
In distributional situations where the rate of return and the investment
level is the same for the two participants, all the fairness ideals defend an
equal sharing of the outcome. Hence, moral wriggling is only applicable in
situations where there is some inequality in either the rate of return or the in-
vestment. Even in these situations, every fairness ideal has an average offer of
50%. In Table 7, however, we see in the second column that in the ambiguous
situations, choosing a fairness ideal self-interestedly would on average justify
increasing one’s own share of the total income with 9.3 percentage points.
A simple test of the idea of moral wriggling is therefore to see whether the
participants consistently ask for a larger share in distributional situations
where there is scope for such moral wriggling. In the third column, we see
that there is indeed a difference of 2.2 percentage points between the actual
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amount demanded in the non-ambiguous and ambiguous situations, but this
difference is small and not statistically significant. We conclude from this
that while we cannot rule out that some individuals exploit such scope for
moral wriggling, there is little reason to suspect that this is pervasive to a
degree that would invalidate our analysis.
[Table 7 about here.]
5 Concluding remarks
Our analysis relates to the interesting studies of Konow (2000) and of Frohlich
et al. (2004), which also apply versions of the dictator game with production
in order to analyse the role of fairness considerations in individual choices.
In line with our findings, both studies find that the distinction between effort
and talent matters for many people. At the same time, there are important
differences between these studies and ours.
The focus of Konow (2000) is to examine the extent to which fairness
considerations can be explained by a single fairness ideal, namely the liberal
egalitarian principle. In contrast, our aim has been to examine the pre-
valence of different fairness ideals among the participants, including liberal
egalitarianism as one possibility. Moreover, even though liberal egalitarian-
ism turns out to be the most prevalent fairness ideal among our participants,
the majority of them hold other fairness ideals.
Frohlich et al. (2004) share our focus on the pluralism of fairness ideals,
and they also find that there is substantial heterogeneity in their group of
participants. They study this issue in an environment where it is not possible
to distinguish libertarians from liberal egalitarians. More importantly, their
choice model does not allow for any active trade-off between a fairness ideal
and pecuniary self-interest, and thus they are unable to distinguish clearly
between a fairness ideal and the weight people attach to fairness considera-
tions. This implies that they are unable to study possible heterogeneity in
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the weight people attach to fairness considerations (while such heterogeneity
would bias their classification procedure).
The main aim of our study has been to show how we can estimat simultan-
eously the degree of heterogeneity in fairness ideals and in the weight people
attach to fairness considerations. It turns out that both of these kinds of
heterogeneity matter in explaining individual behaviour in our experiment,
but we believe that this is also true more generally. Value pluralism is a
characteristic feature of modern societies, and thus it could also potentially
constitute an important ingredient in the explanation of economic phenom-
ena.
Appendix: The likelihood function
In order to take into account the fact that individuals make repeated choices,
it is neccessary to introduce the notation Ji for the number of choices indi-
vidual i makes. The likelihood of an individual i of type k making a pro-
posal yij from the set of feasible proposals Yij given a parameter vector
θ = (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, γ, ζ, σ) is
Lik(θ) =
∫ ∞
0
(
Ji∏
j=1
eV
k(yij ;aij ,qij ,β,γ)∑
s∈Yij e
V k(s;aij ,qij ,β,γ)
)
f(β; ζ, σ)dβ. (8)
Revelt and Train (1998) calls this a “mixed logit with repeated choices”. We
assume that f(β; ·) is log-normal, parameterised such that log(β) ∼ N(ζ, σ2).
The total likelihood, integrating over the distribution of unobserved moral
type, is a finite mixture over the type distribution determined by the discrete
distribution induced by λ,
Li(θ) =
4∑
k=1
λkLik(θ). (9)
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The estimation is with simulated maximum likelihood, with 250 random
draws with antithetics for the numerical integration over the f(β) distribu-
tion. The estimation is performed with FmOpt, Christopher Ferrall’s efficient
routines for finite mixture models (Ferrall, 2005).
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of fairness ideals. Pair-wise plots of mk(a,q) against
mj(a,q) for all the distributional situations in our data. The weight of dots
indicates the number of observations at that point.
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Figure 2: Deterministic utility, V (y) = γy − β(y −m)2/2, for an individual
with m = 0.5 (marked by a vertical line). Calculated at the deciles of the
estimated β distribution using the estimates in the preferred specification (3)
in Table 6. Money, y, is measured in units of thousands of NOK.
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Figure 3: Empirical distribution function of offers made (as share of total
production) and predictions from the estimated model. The solid line is
our experimental data while the dashed line is predictions made from the
estimates in specification (3). Predictions are made at the distributional
situations in our dataset.
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second game
first game 0 100 200 total
0 0 1 0 1
100 0 9 39 48
200 1 46 · 47
total 1 56 39 96
Table 1: Investments in the first and the second game.
investment
talent same different total
same 44 50 94
different 54 42 96
total 98 92 190
Table 2: Number of observations in each of the four classes of distributional
situations.
offer
share amount
(in NOK)
mean 0.271 229
median 0.292 200
standard deviation 0.219 219
minimum 0 0
maximum 0.75 800
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of offers made to opponent.
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offer frequency share cumulative
(in NOK) share
0 58 30.53 30.53
100 15 7.89 38.42
150 3 1.58 40.00
200 39 20.53 60.53
250 1 0.53 61.05
300 25 13.16 74.21
400 23 12.11 86.32
500 6 3.16 89.47
600 8 4.21 93.68
650 1 0.53 94.21
700 3 1.58 95.79
750 1 0.53 96.32
800 7 3.68 100.00
Table 4: Full distribution of offers made to opponent.
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specification
y1 on 1 2 3 4
constant -56.48 -260 -289 -798
(39.60) (90.3) (78.3) (81.7)
a1q1 0.936
(0.069)
a2q2 0.667
(0.069)
a1 157 125
(21) (16)
a2 143 101
(21) (16)
q1 3.62 3.07
(0.37) (0.31)
q2 2.84 2.19
(0.37) (0.31)
R2 0.66 0.36 0.45 0.64
Table 5: Descriptive regressions.
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specification
parameter 1 2 3 4 5
λ1, strict egalitarian, strong 0.3342 0.3971 0.3249 0.3719
(0.0969) (0.0900) (0.1362) (0.1130)
λ2, strict egalitarian, weak 0.0877 0.4032 0.3958 0.0963
(0.0759) (0.1086) (0.1449) (0.0965)
λ3, liberal egalitarian 0.4078 0.3967 0.4338 0.5318
(0.0924) (0.1054) (0.0923) (0.1017)
λ4, libertarian 0.1703 0.2001 0.1681 0.2792
(0.0641) (0.0707) (0.0641) (0.0813)
ζ 5.235 4.794 5.167 4.474 4.611
(0.487) (0.447) (0.475) (0.549) (0.455)
σ 3.710 3.017 3.703 3.468 3.129
(0.728) (0.524) (0.690) (0.702) (0.576)
γ 23.68 21.56 22.48 16.48 19.86
(4.10) (3.35) (3.54) (2.44) (3.09)
Log likelihood -346.07 -357.22 -347.25 -369.92 -358.33
Table 6: Estimates of structural model. Standard errors, calculated using
the outer product of the gradient (Berndt et al., 1974) in parentheses.
means
n maxkm
k/X y/X
non-ambiguous situations 44 0.500 0.711
ambiguous situations 146 0.593 0.733
difference 0.093 0.022
p-value, t-test of no difference 0.559
Table 7: Scope for moral wriggling. Non-ambiguous situations are distribu-
tional situations where all the principles that we consider agree on what is
fair. Ambiguous situations are situations where the principles disagree. On
average, every fairness ideal is to offer 50%.
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